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Summary box
What is already known about this subject?
 ► Universal health coverage (UHC) and global health 
security (GHS) are frequently being used in tandem 
by policymakers, recognising that there are syner-
gies between the two parallel agendas.
What are the new findings?
 ► UHC and GHS goals are in tension. The research 
and practice communities that represent these two 
streams need to engage so that smart strategies can 
be identified to improve both aims simultaneously 
using codependent, but distinct policy.
 ► Risk and human rights are two areas of convergence 
between UHC and GHS.
 ► Divergence appears in the conceptualisation of risk 
at the collective or individual level, and the prioritisa-
tion of domestic or global activity.
What are the recommendations for policy and 
practice?
 ► Health systems strengthening can be the policy 
mechanism which, brings GHS and UHC together, 
elevating health and mitigating risk for all.
AbSTrACT
Global health security and universal health coverage have 
been frequently considered as “two sides of the same 
coin”. Yet, greater analysis is required as to whether and 
where these two ideals converge, and what important 
differences exist. A consequence of ignoring their 
individual characteristics is to distort global and local 
health priorities in an effort to streamline policymaking 
and funding activities. This paper examines the areas 
of convergence and divergence between global health 
security and universal health coverage, both conceptually 
and empirically. We consider analytical concepts of risk 
and human rights as fundamental to both goals, but also 
identify differences in priorities between the two ideals. We 
support the argument that the process of health system 
strengthening provides the most promising mechanism of 
benefiting both goals.
InTroduCTIon
Global health security (GHS) and universal 
health coverage (UHC) are frequently 
regarded as two sides of the same coin,1 or 
more cynically as a marriage of convenience.2 
Yet, there has been little consideration of 
how these ideals interact, with academics and 
policymakers assuming that actions for one 
will also be advantageous to the other. This 
paper analyses at a macro level where these 
ideals converge, and where differences lie 
both conceptually and empirically. We argue 
both GHS and UHC focus on the mitigation 
of risk and human rights. Mitigating the 
risk of individuals who face impoverishment 
owing to healthcare expenditure is core to 
UHC. For GHS, the risk is transnational and 
emerges from outbreaks with cross-border 
potential. Hence, the bearer of the risk, 
and the appropriate steps to mitigate it, are 
different in each agenda and may sometimes 
be in conflict. Similarly, while both agendas 
enshrine human rights and we see conver-
gence through the realisation of the right to 
health, we see distinctions between economic, 
cultural and social rights with civil and polit-
ical rights.
It is important to address these differences 
before considering the mutual opportunities 
offered by their ‘marriage’, to ensure that 
inherent differences are not jettisoned for 
pragmatic reasons, risking distortion of local 
health priorities. We support the link that 
health system strengthening (HSS) creates 
opportunity to connect GHS and UHC in a 
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tangible way, with clear policy pathways that can benefit 
both ideals.
defining Global Health Security (GHS) and universal Health 
Coverage (uHC)
We recognise that the definition of UHC can vary in 
distinct, but convergent ways.3 A holistic definition is 
ensuring individuals have access, without discrimination 
to comprehensive, appropriate and timely, quality health 
services determined at the national level according 
to needs, as well as access to safe and affordable medi-
cines, while ensuring that the use of these services do not 
expose users to financial difficulties.4 However, for the 
purpose of this paper, we focus within this definition on 
the extent to which the costs of healthcare are covered.5 
We recognise that such a definition is not comprehen-
sive, but we also acknowledge that the two components 
of UHC (access and risk protection) are in tension when 
it comes to decision making about provision, particularly 
in resource-poor settings, as the goal of access would 
lead to prioritisation of the most (cost) effective services, 
whereas a focus on financial protection would favour 
allocation of resources to more expensive interventions.6 
However, in stressing the importance of universal access 
to effective healthcare, and universal financial protection 
against the costs of this care, the definition is consistent 
with the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), which includes in Goal 3 "ensure healthy 
lives and promote well-being for all at all ages" and in 
particular target (3.8) to “achieve UHC including finan-
cial risk protection, access to quality essential healthcare 
services and access to safe, effective, quality essential 
medicines and vaccines for all”.7
We define GHS activities as those concerned with 
preventing, detecting and responding to infectious 
disease threats of international concern to limit any 
socioeconomic impact of transborder disease, which 
mirrors the WHO definition.8 Nevertheless, we recognise 
that GHS is “very much like a chameleon” “essentially 
contested” and “not adequately defined”.9–12
GHS is underpinned by a legal instrument, the Inter-
national Health Regulations (2005) (IHR).13 The IHR 
provide guidance for how states should develop and 
maintain their national capacities to minimise public 
health threats. While there is no binding international 
legal equivalent for UHC, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights guarantees 
the human right to health. General Comment 14 on the 
right to health, which provides interpretive guidance on 
the right to health, proposes a framework of availability, 
accessibility, acceptability and quality.14 Moreover, policy 
initiatives create normative guidance on how to imple-
ment UHC, including The World Health Report 2010,5 
Making Fair Choices on the Path to UHC and the United 
Nations General Assembly 67/81.15 Similarly, GHS has 
the policy and operational work of the Global Health 
Security Agenda (GHSA), an international partnership 
launched in 2014 and now comprising over 60 countries, 
international organisations and non-governmental stake-
holders,16 which provides political impetus and interna-
tional collaboration to meeting IHR requirements.
Current intersections between the two concepts
Five key works have sought to connect GHS and UHC. Jain 
and Alam highlight that UHC can help advance GHS.17 
First, low or no financial barriers to accessing healthcare 
stimulates demand for health services which facilitates 
early infectious disease detection. Second, protecting 
people from catastrophic financial risk reduces an indi-
vidual’s possibility of falling into poverty, an important 
social determinant of infectious disease spread.18
Yates, Dhillon and Rannan-Eliya echo Jain and Alam’s 
first thesis verbalising “the availability of accessible 
and universal healthcare services in all countries is the 
crucial first line of defence for all against such threats to 
health”.19 Moreover, if people are unable to access health-
care in their local communities, this increases the likeli-
hood of individuals crossing borders to seek healthcare, 
thus increasing the risk of onward transmission interna-
tionally.19 This work shows how these two concepts are 
mirrored empirically: suggesting that UHC’s relationship 
between financial protection and equitable distribution 
of risk (which addresses people’s ability to pay, while 
protecting the sick), mirrors the relationship between 
donor and recipient states for GHS, whereby wealthy 
states finance outbreak responses in affected states. While 
this risk pooling is not part of the IHR or GHSA mandate, 
it can be argued that IHR compliance should reflect the 
ability to pay while protecting weaker states.19
Moreover, Yates et al highlight that movements towards 
UHC build trust.2 19 This form of trust may exist between 
governments and populations, between health providers 
and patients and between financiers and recipients of 
health. This trust may foster effective collaboration when 
an outbreak emerges, improving public compliance 
with state-led interventions to limit disease spread.20 21 
However, Ooms et al are more sceptical of joining the two 
agendas together, recognising that they are synergistic, 
but not self-evidently so.2 In resource-poor settings, they 
recognise distinct policy pathways for UHC and GHS; for 
example, whether to fund development of surveillance 
capabilities or social health insurance mechanisms, a 
point we would agree with.
Ooms et al further underscore the instrumentalism in 
linking these agendas. Tying UHC to GHS may provide 
greater leverage for financing UHC2 (Yamey echoes this 
suggestion, that while the world’s gaze is on GHS in the 
wake of Ebola, associating these can be a tool for getting 
attention to UHC and the health of populations in low 
and middle-income (LMIC) settings22). Conversely, GHS 
advocates may connect with the UHC agenda to gain 
legitimacy among those who conceive of the security 
discourse being too focused on high income country 
(HIC) interests.2 However, Ooms et al conflate UHC 
and HSS. These are used interchangeably, and this risks 
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unclear understandings of what UHC entails, furthering 
the potential for misaligned priorities.
The fifth work considers GHS as “collective” secu-
rity and “individual” security which broadly aligns with 
UHC.23 Heymann suggests that a difference exists 
between collective health security concerned with mutual 
global vulnerabilities posed by transborder spread of 
acute public health issues, and individual health secu-
rity which includes access to safe and effective health 
services, products and technologies.23 Heymann’s argu-
ment follows that if there is individual health security, this 
contributes to collective health security at the commu-
nity, national and global levels (i.e GHS).
Conceptual convergence: risk
Both UHC and GHS aim to mitigate potential health 
and economic threats either at the level of the individual 
(UHC) or the collective (GHS). For UHC, one such risk 
results from individuals’ exposure to economic hazard as 
a result of a health event, that is, an individual’s health 
needs may be met only by incurring impoverishing or 
catastrophic costs associated with accessing appropriate 
healthcare.19 This form of individual or familial risk is 
centred on the cost, rather than the type of illness and 
can relate to acute to chronic conditions. Anyone may be 
exposed to this financial risk, the potential exposure is 
a lifetime, the likelihood of occurrence is high, and the 
consequences of exposure are disproportionately large 
for the poor who have insufficient funds to ensure finan-
cial resilience when confronted with a health concern.24 
However, UHC offers an effective risk reduction interven-
tion: proposing prepayment and pooling mechanisms to 
reduce both the probability of healthcare-related losses 
occurring, and the severity of their impacts on house-
hold’s budgets when they do. This also enhances indi-
viduals’ willingness and ability to access healthcare as 
opposed to delaying careseeking until they become very 
ill, thereby driving up healthcare costs for everyone. 
Accordingly, risk reduction through UHC benefits both 
individuals and societies. Moreover, reducing risk to any 
health concern through UHC, including communicable 
disease, has significant opportunity costs for GHS.
Instead of the ‘livelihood risk’ for UHC, the risk for GHS 
results from an infectious disease hazard which may result 
in a large-scale outbreak, threatening a population and/
or economic or political stability as a result of opportu-
nity costs lost through interrupted access to international 
markets, reduced international travel and fear among the 
population. Despite the IHR seeking to minimise such 
disruption, there are several examples of factors beyond 
a government’s control during an outbreak which impact 
a range of sectors beyond health.25–27 Indeed, President 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf argued that the best action the USA 
could take to support Liberia in the Ebola epidemic was 
to “not ostracise us via trade”, suggesting that severing 
economic ties would pose as much risk as the virus itself 
(Emily Mendenhall, personal communication, 2017).
Accordingly, GHS focuses on future-proofing pandemic 
risk through preparedness. It does this by contingency 
planning for a range of disease threats.28 Luckily, large-
scale international outbreaks are rare events, neverthe-
less, the severity of the potential (socio)economic impact 
of an outbreak leads to considerable investment in risk 
mitigation. This inadvertently may bias the public’s risk 
perception, creating potentially disruptive influences on 
“business as usual” for international travel and trade.12 29 
Exemplifying this was the West-Africa Ebola epidemic, 
which had a relatively low likelihood of ‘anyone in the 
globe’ becoming infected, because of the low reproduc-
tive ratio of the disease. Nevertheless, despite the low 
actual risk, there was a high perceived risk. Margaret 
Chan reflected “I have never seen a health event strike 
such fear and terror, well beyond the affected commu-
nities”.30 This fear led to the implementation of expen-
sive policies such as airport screening apparatus in HICs. 
These were not instrumental in reducing the actual risk 
of disease incursion but were effective political placebos 
implemented by governments to reduce perceived risks 
felt by HIC citizens.
Conceptual convergence: human rights
Heymann’s distinction between GHS as collective secu-
rity and UHC as individual security allows convergence 
between the two agendas through the lens of human 
rights also. Achieving both GHS and UHC require states 
to comply with their obligations and duties under interna-
tional, regional and domestic human rights law. Human 
rights are often conceptualised as matters of individual 
security, whereby a state fails to respect, protect or fulfil 
an individual’s human rights. However, even where an 
individual successfully seeks recourse against a state for 
a human rights violation, such decisions have a collec-
tive impact, setting precedent that results in the state 
complying with its human rights obligations elsewhere. 
This is particularly the case for UHC, where human 
rights actions launched by individuals have, according 
to some proponents, addressed underlying systemic fail-
ures by governments to take steps to immediately realise 
the right to non-discrimination and progressively realise 
the right to health.31 These latter obligations typically fall 
within the realm of economic, social and cultural rights. 
This requires states to progressively realise these rights 
to the maximum of their available resources, while not 
regressing from steps already taken for non-discrimina-
tion and meeting minimum core obligations.32 In contrast, 
much of the dialogue discussing GHS and human rights 
relates to civil and political rights, such as those codified 
in the IHR; rights that the state must respect, provide and 
fulfil such as the rights to life, freedom of movement, and 
freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.33 While this civil and political rights framing is 
understandable as it focuses on the short-term and imme-
diate vulnerability of individuals to the state’s actions 
when seeking to protect the many and/or the economy 
during an outbreak, the goals of GHS are fundamentally 
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grounded in economic, social and cultural rights, namely, 
the right to health. The right to health includes the obli-
gation that states take steps necessary for the “prevention, 
treatment and control epidemic, endemic, occupational 
and other diseases”.34 This obligation is congruent with 
GHS, and is also codified in the IHR, for example, within 
the core capacity obligations.
As a result, convergence between UHC and GHS can 
be found through the realisation the right to health, with 
both UHC and GHS requiring that states address inac-
tion or regression in realising the right to health to the 
mutual benefit of both ideals.
Conceptual divergence: inward versus outward: individual 
versus global security
Despite unifying features, there are differences in each 
with respect to the characterisation, who is identified 
as “at risk” and what responses have been taken to miti-
gate risk. We suggest these understandings of risk mirror 
divergent conceptualisations of security.
GHS has sought to answer two questions: security from 
what and for whom?12 We know that the ‘from what’ 
is different in the case of UHC and GHS, as outlined 
above, but so too is the ‘for whom’. For UHC, at risk is 
the everyday person who may be affected by ill health 
and the associated costs, or the inability to access health 
services due to other non-financial barriers. For GHS, 
however, the global population is at risk as their chances 
of contracting an infectious disease are reduced through 
ensuring GHS. Others have argued that the referent 
object for GHS is the economy or national security of 
a particular state fearing the socioeconomic impact of 
an outbreak on trade and travel.35 36 Accordingly, GHS 
predominantly mitigates risk from the top down, and 
UHC may mitigate risk from the bottom up, although 
infrastructure and support is required from the state to 
support individuals in risk pooling behaviour.
Both UHC and GHS risks are mitigated by financial 
investment in health. For UHC, the investment reduces 
the time people delay care-seeking due to the financial 
burden of paying for health. Through GHS, the invest-
ment is in pandemic preparedness; strengthening surveil-
lance and response mechanisms to respond to infectious 
disease outbreaks under IHR (2005). Consequentially, 
the rationales and methods for mitigating against these 
risks—from the household to state levels—are quite 
different.
While private and non-profit actors are vital in global 
health, we argue that states play a fundamental role in 
the convergence of the two risks identified in this paper. 
However, a distinction emerges between mitigating a 
state’s risks which are domestic priorities, and those 
that are globally focused. For instance, state priorities 
that are domestically focused may involve prepayment 
schemes to reduce the financial risks posed to citizens 
(UHC). On the other hand, states prioritising GHS 
focus on implementing the IHR (2005) to reduce the 
risk of severe economic impact in the case of an acute 
public health event (Wenham, Examining Sovereignty 
in Global Health, PhD, 2016). These risks are funda-
mentally different, although the policies deployed may 
carry opportunity costs for both UHC and GHS goals. 
Governments, particularly in resource-constrained 
settings must decide whether to prioritise their global 
or domestic responsibilities, based on which risk they 
consider the most important. National leaders may prior-
itise one agenda over the other, aligning with political 
and economic priorities; for example, they may prioritise 
UHC when fighting an election as it is popular with the 
domestic electorate, yet focus on GHS when looking to 
attract donor dollars.
Practical convergence: HSS
We argue that HSS can be the policy mechanism which 
brings GHS and UHC together, elevating health and miti-
gating risk for all. This echoes Kutzin and Sparkes who 
argue, “health system strengthening is what we do: UHC, 
health security and resilience is what we want”.3
A health system can be defined as the ensemble of 
all public and private organisations, institutions and 
resources involved in the improvement, maintenance or 
restoration of health.37 HSS refers to policy and program-
matic activity designed to apply systems thinking to health, 
to improve overall performance.38 The WHO framework 
for HSS encapsulates six building blocks: service delivery, 
health workforce, health information systems, medical 
products, health financing and leadership and gover-
nance.39 The health system shapes many people’s health 
by determining how s/he accesses medical care, from 
whom s/he receives medical care, what medicines are 
available and accessible, what technologies are affordable 
and available for testing and diagnostics and how s/he is 
expected to pay for it,39 and as such contains many of the 
tenets of UHC.
For UHC, functioning health systems organised 
around people, institutions and resources leads to 
improved access, quality, sustainability and affordability 
for individuals.38 For GHS, successfully functioning 
health systems underpin countries’ ability to detect and 
respond to disease threats.39 In this way, a response to a 
health emergency (GHS) should be embedded within an 
existing health system, involving Farmer’s interweaving 
of “stuff, staff, systems and space” to address the needs 
of an epidemic and population health.40 Kluge expands 
this, providing suggestions for how to interlink these 
concepts, noting that investing in HSS improves GHS, 
so that systems become resilient to health crises and can 
respond when needed.41 By investing in health systems, 
this increases the resilience of states to respond to 
outbreaks of disease that spread across national borders, 
thereby investing indirectly in GHS.3 38 HSS therefore is a 
common road to both UHC and GHS.3
Indicators convergence
Beyond the conceptual, we assessed convergence and 
divergence of UHC, GHS and HSS based on policy 
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Figure 1 Synergy between global health security (GHS), universal health coverage (UHC) and health systems strengthening 
(HSS).
metrics. As these concepts are embedded within key 
pieces of global policy, it seemed appropriate to use these 
indicators to ascertain whether there was practical as well 
as conceptual convergence between goals. We mapped 
GHS, using the first edition of the Joint External Evalua-
tion Tool indicators as a proxy, and UHC, using SDG indi-
cators 3.8.1 and 3.8.2, to measure health service coverage 
and financial protection24 42 43 and HSS, using the six 
WHO Building Blocks. As these indicators link to each 
policy aim, where we see convergence is a direct evalua-
tion of how the concepts overlap. Figure 1 shows a tepid 
synergy between UHC and GHS. Although UHC indi-
cators explicitly include reference to GHS, in a catchall 
“Health Security IHR Core Capacity Index”, it is not a 
key component of the index. Convergence appeared in 
financing, health workforce availability and capacity and 
access to medicines. There was not even overlap between 
the “infectious disease” indicators of UHC and those of 
GHS. However, despite limited overlap between GHS 
and UHC, there is considerable overlap between HSS 
and both GHS and UHC, with each of the six building 
blocks finding a comparable indicator with the other two 
agendas, and all three goals focusing on health work-
force, access to medicines and financing/financial risk 
protection.
Concerns linking these agendas
Synergising GHS and UHC raises several red flags. For 
UHC focusing on health through prepayment risks prior-
itising curative clinical services at the expense of individual 
and population health promotion and prevention.44 This 
leads to more healthcare services but worse outcomes 
overall and distributed benefits less equitably.44 For GHS, 
the limitation is its focus on national and economic 
security and the threat of infectious disease amid trade 
routes. This prioritises diseases which affect dominant 
trading networks of HICs, creating a quasi-postcolonial 
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power imbalance denoting which diseases are considered 
globally important.
There remain health issues which fall outside of both 
of GHS and UHC (and HSS) priority setting. Recognising 
the conditions that are systematically excluded from both 
agendas is equally important. For example, road safety, 
improvement of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) 
facilities, pest control and neglected disease which 
are core to improving human health, but neglected in 
both UHC and GHS.44 Yet, many donors expect discrete 
funding priorities that can be easily measured, such as 
treatment for the big three. Indeed, addressing the poten-
tial economic threats to national labour force through a 
multitude of further health burdens may be one way to 
align the concept of “risk” between UHC and GHS.
A further challenge is resource allocation: in health-
care systems worldwide, there are gaps between avail-
able funding and possible health interventions leading 
to priority setting.3 15 What are the ethical, political 
and socioeconomic implications of prioritising GHS, 
which may threaten HICs, as well as LMICS, rather than 
addressing Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) relating 
to the growing tobacco epidemic in Africa or ultrapro-
cessed food in South America? Priority setting implies 
difficult choices have to be made and raises important 
ethical and equity considerations. UHC requires decision 
makers to agree on criteria and establish transparent and 
fair priority setting processes.15 Further elaboration is 
needed to understand how concerns for GHS and UHC 
can be considered within this.
Additionally, open definitions of “health systems” and 
how to measure their strength leave the door open for an 
emphasis on GHS and entire disease areas (such as NCDs) 
that does not address health inequities within a country 
with limited resources. Like Unicef’s support of selective 
primary healthcare in the 1980s—which was introduced 
as a means to simplify and actualise primary healthcare 
goals—and the Gavi and Global Fund approach to HSS,45 
promoting an HSS model that includes both GHS and 
UHC means promoting those parts of a health system 
that overlap between the two frameworks and overlooks 
what falls outside. Accordingly, we must consider what 
defines a strong health system on an individual country 
basis that must address both the individual’s and the 
population’s needs.
ConCluSIon
UHC and GHS are increasingly linked in global health 
policy. This paper illuminated the potential synergies 
between the two parallel agendas, but has considered 
the inherent tensions of a joined up UHC-GHS frame-
work. We consider risk as being a unifying conceptual 
tool: the risk of the international spread of infectious 
disease on a population and national/economic security 
is fundamental to GHS. For UHC, the risk centres on the 
threat of financial impoverishment due to catastrophic 
health expenditures. However, these agendas are not 
comprehensively aligned. We recognise divergence 
between these frameworks; between the individual and 
the collective and between domestic and international 
priorities. Empirically, we show there are some overlap-
ping indicators between GHS and UHC, but there are 
also a number of indicators outside this synergy. To that 
extent, the UHC and GHS goals are in tension. The 
research and practice communities that represent these 
two streams need to engage so that smart strategies can 
be identified to improve both aims simultaneously using 
codependent, but distinct policy. We suggest HSS as 
a method to achieve both and in doing so build more 
“equitable and sustained improvements across health 
services and health outcomes”.39 Yet, we caution that this 
is not panacea, but a meaningful step to bringing these 
global health agendas together in a more comprehensive 
mechanism.
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